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Abstract
As firms are increasingly more dependent on
Information Technology (IT) for their business
strategies and value creation activities, risks
associated with IT become one of the top concerns for
corporate boards and managers. This study examines
the impact of IT-related risk factor disclosure in Item
1A of the 10-K annual report on stock price crashes.
We use Latent Dirichlet Allocation topic modeling to
identify risk categories in risk disclosures between
2006 and 2017. IT risk emerged as one of the key risk
categories. We find that IT risk disclosure is positively
correlated with a firm’s future stock price crash risk.
We further separate IT risk factor disclosures into two
categories: IT value risk that relates to a firm’s use of
and reliance on information technology for its
operations to reach its goals and objectives, and
cybersecurity risk that could lead to a loss or leak of
data. We find that while the correlation between cyber
security risk disclosure and a firm’s future crash risk
is significant, IT value risk disclosures do not have a
significant correlation.

1 Introduction
Long considered as a strategic asset for
organizations, information technology (IT) has
become essential for the success and even survival of
the firm. IT plays a significant strategic and
operational role in businesses. It is, therefore, the key
responsibility of management to manage the risks
associated with information systems (IS) to minimize
their negative consequences to the firm [1]–[3]. As
publicly traded firms are required to disclose their IT
risks along with the other risks that they are exposed
to in their annual financial filings with the SEC, the
question then arises as to whether these risk
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disclosures are important, and what the long-term
impacts of these disclosures are to the firm.
A considerable amount of research has
examined the relation between IT failure events and its
immediate market effects. Cavusoglu et al. [3] found
that a cybersecurity breach costs a target firm on
average $1.65 billion per announcement. Bharadwaj et
al. [4] found that IT failures results in a 2% drop in
stock prices over a two-day window. Viewing IT
failure as a strategic weakness, Goldstein et al. [5] also
found a negative stock price relation to the IT failures.
On the contrary, Gordon et al. [6] found that
information security announcements actually increase
a firm’s stock prices, arguing that such disclosures
signal active involvement by the firm in securing their
IT assets.
However, to the best of our knowledge, there
is no existing study in the IS literature that looks at the
long-term effect of IT risk disclosures on the firm.
Risk factor disclosures can hint at future firm
performance degradations, but IT risk disclosure
literature is sparse. Wang et al. [7] looked at IT
security risk factors and its linkage to the realization
of data breaches, but their dataset is limited to handcollected cybersecurity breach announcements in
major media outlets and they do not look into the
market impact of the risk disclosure itself.
Furthermore, cybersecurity risks are not the only
information technology related risks that a firm is
exposed to. Yet, the existing literature predominantly
focuses on cybersecurity.
This paper aims to contribute to the risk
factor disclosure literature by filling in the knowledge
gap concerning the long-term effects of IT-related
risks. Our primary research question is whether ITrelated risk factor disclosures affect a firm’s stock
price crash risk, a long-term stock return measure. And
if so, do cybersecurity and other IT risks differ in their
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impact? To answer our research question we use topic
modeling techniques to identify IT risk disclosures in
Item 1A in 10-K filings. We use the resource
weaknesses perspective from strategic management
literature as a theoretical guide to categorize the IT risk
disclosures into IT value and IT cybersecurity risk
disclosures.
We found that, consistent with our main
hypothesis, IT risk factor disclosures are positively
associated with the long-term stock price crash risk of
the company. IT cybersecurity risk factors in particular
were found to have a positive association with the
crash risk, but IT value risk factors did not.

2 Stock Price Crash Risk
Our paper focuses on stock price crash risk,
which captures the chances of extreme negative
returns in a firm’s stock. Theoretically, stock price
crashes are caused by managers withholding negative
information about the firm and preventing that
information from being made public. When the
amount of negative information being stockpiled
reaches a level that managers cannot withhold any
longer, the bad news is released all at once, leading to
a stock price crash [8]. The accounting literature
investigates several determinants of crash risk,
however, there is as yet no study that investigates the
effect of IT risk factor disclosures on stock price crash
risk.

3 Hypothesis Development
Given the important role of IS/IT plays in
day-to-day business operations and overall firm
strategy in any contemporary organization, failures in
a firm’s IT adversely influence the firm’s ability to
achieve its business objectives and gain a competitive
advantage. In any firm, IS implementations are
initiated to deliver business value to the firm.
However, there is always a risk that the firm may not
be able to gain the intended benefits from the IS/IT,
and investors are keenly aware of the risks associated
with IT [9]. There are many causes of this risk,
including implementation challenges, unmanaged
complexity (scope creep), IT governance issues, or
poorly specified project requirements to name a few.
As previous studies have shown, there are severe
consequences to a firm’s stock price when IT risks
materialize and an IT failure occurs [4], [5], [10].
We argue that, if an existing IT system or a
newly implemented IT project has a significant risk of
failure to achieve its performance goals and to deliver
value to the firm, managers will attempt to hide the
information from outside investors for as long as
possible to avoid damage to the firm’s value. This
hoarding of bad news about the IT systems of a firm
will eventually reach a tipping point, and the

information will be released to the market all at once
and induce a stock price crash. The bubble “bursting”
can occur when investors recognize that the expected
progress has not been achieved for ongoing projects or
intended performance improvements have not been
delivered for the existing IT. The bad news could also
be revealed to the market if the IT risk is materialized
(e.g. the firm experienced a data breach) or an IT
failure occurs (e.g., the firm experienced an IS/IT
related outage). In this way, IT risk factors can be
viewed as an early indicator for future bad news
announcements related to a firm’s information systems
that cause stock price crashes. We postulate that, due
to the requirements of the SEC to disclose any and all
risk factors, IT-related risk factor disclosures in a
firm’s 10-K would cut through the veil of opacity and
reveal that the firm’s IS/IT may not deliver its intended
business value or be well protected. Hence, we
hypothesize:
H1: IT-related risk factor disclosures are
positively correlated with a firm’s stock price crash
risk.
As discussed previously, IT has an inherent
risk in failing to deliver its full value to the firm. A
firm’s inability to leverage its IT resource can cause
the firm to fail to appropriate the intended value of IT,
but not all IT failures can be explained through that
theoretical lens. A firm can possess necessary
competencies to implement IT systems successfully,
derive value from its IT investments, and gain a
competitive advantage as a result, while it may also
fail to protect against cybersecurity attacks such as
Denial-of-Service attacks. Additionally, a cyber attack
may not always affect a firm’s ability to operate,
especially if only a data breach is involved; the
subsequent news of the breach will certainly
temporarily affect the company’s market value and/or
goodwill but will not affect the company’s ability to
function.
We point out these two distinct modes of
failure and risks, thus we break down IT risk into two
types: IT cybersecurity risk and IT value risk. First, IT
value risk is the risk that the firm will not be able to
realize the full-intended value of the IT systems. This
risk originates from the firm’s (lack of) skills and
competencies in implementing and running an IT
system and deriving its full-intended value. The lack
of maturity in the firm’s IT strategy, governance, and
management processes is often to blame. Second, IT
cybersecurity risk is any risk that the confidentiality,
availability, or integrity of a firm’s IT and data assets
can be adversely affected, often through attacks from
adversaries [11] and that causes harm to the firm’s
business objectives either through negative press or a
loss of function of the firm’s IT systems. Importantly,
we differentiate the two types of IT risk based more so
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on the sources of the risk rather than the impact on
firm’s operations when the risk is materialized.
We theorize that IT value risk disclosures will
reflect the firm’s inability to fully utilize their IT
systems. That is, the more IT value risks the firm
disclosures, the more informed the investors will be
about the firm’s increasing inability to capture the full
value from their IT systems and the more informed the
investors will be about the state of the firm’s IS. The
information that suboptimal IT/IS generates would be
inaccurate, incomplete, or not timely. The managers
and executives relying on the information from these
systems would make suboptimal decisions, resulting
in performance degradation and increasing the risk of
a major stock price crash. Furthermore, as IS/IT is
ingrained in all aspects of businesses, suboptimal IS/IT
would cause inefficiencies in the business processes,
resulting in further performance degradation. Thus, we
postulate that:
H1a: IT value risk disclosures are positively
correlated with a firm’s stock price crash risk.
Vulnerabilities in IS/IT that an organization
possesses are liability for the firm. Malicious internal
users and external hackers would exploit these
vulnerabilities. We argue that IT cybersecurity risk
disclosures will reflect the firm’s lack of protection for
their IT assets from cybersecurity risks. That is, the
more cybersecurity risks the firm disclosures, the more
informed the investors will be about the firm’s
increasing inability to protect its IT infrastructure and
underlying key business data. Hence, we posit that:
H1b: IT cybersecurity risk disclosures are
positively correlated with a firm’s stock price crash
risk.

4 Data Collection
We collect and analyze the data on U.S.
publicly traded firms to examine the relationship
between risk factor disclosure and stock price crash
risk. We obtain risk factor disclosures from Item 1A of
Form 10-K annual reports filed by publicly traded
companies to the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC). The SEC mandated companies to
include Item 1A in their 10-K filings since December
2005. Hence, our data sample includes 10-K filings
submitted from December 2005 to July 2017. We
collected 96,223 annual reports with reporting periods
ranging from fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2016.
To extract IT-related risk factor disclosures
from the annual reports, we wrote a heuristic algorithm

1

If a topic has the highest weight, the risk factor is
considered to be related to the corresponding topic
and that topic only. We used other cut-off values of

that uses the HTML structure of a 10-K filing to
identify and collect individual risk factors in Item 1A
of the filing. Specifically, the algorithm parses the
HTML filing and builds a Document Object Model
(DOM) of the filing. Using this algorithm, we
managed to extract 1.72 million risk factors from
62,324 10-K filings. Overall, risk factors were
extracted from 85.864.8% of all available 10-K filings
in our sample period.
Figure 1. Percentage of Risk Factor
Disclosures in Item 1A that are IT Related for
Years 2005 to 2017
4.0%
3.0%
2.0%
1.0%
0.0%
2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017
We use latent Dirichlet allocation (LDA) [12]
to extract 40 risk factor topics from our corpus of 1.72
million risk factors. We used a model fitness statistic
commonly used in the topic modeling literature called
the perplexity score to tune our number of topics. We
manually labeled the 40 topics according to the words
with the highest word weights for each topic and
identified one risk factor topic that was IT related. The
LDA algorithm assumes a generative process through
which each document in corpus was created. In
particular, each document is characterized as random
mixture over latent topics and each topic is
characterized by a distribution over all the words in the
corpus. The LDA algorithm reverse engineers the
generative process and results in document-topic
distribution matrix and topic-word distribution matrix.
Using the topic weights of each risk factor (i.e. a row
in the first matrix)1, we identified 30,987 IT related
risk factors.
Consistent with the strategic management
literature [13] , our theory postulated that there are two
distinct broad classes of IT-related risk. To identify IT

0.05 and 0.1 (in which case a risk factor can have
multiple topics) and our qualitative results have not
changed.
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value and IT cybersecurity risk factor disclosures from
10-K reports, we run another LDA again using the
30,987 IT related risk factors as a corpus. We specified
a 5-topic LDA model and manually mapped each topic
to either IT value related or IT cybersecurity related
according to the top keywords in the topic. Each IT
risk factor was classified as an IT value risk factor or
IT cybersecurity risk factor according to a simple
majority of the sum of its topic weights belonging to
IT value or IT cybersecurity, respectively, and we plot
the proportion of IT value risk factors and IT
cybersecurity risk factors disclosed per year in Figure
2 below.
Figure 2 Number of IT Cybersecurity Risk
Factors and IT Value Risk Factors as a
Percentage of Total IT-Related Risk Factor
Disclosures
100%
80%
60%
40%
IT Security
IT Value

20%
0%
2005

2010

2015

We obtain firm-related data from Compustat
and stock return data from CRSP. After excluding
observations with missing data, our final dataset
includes 11,857 unique firms across 30,347 firm-year
observations.

5 Dependent and Independent Variables
Our main independent variables are related to
the risk disclosures. We used the topic of each risk
factor disclosure found in the 10-K document to
calculate the risk disclosure variables of interest for
each firm year observation. Subscripts i and t denote
the 10-K filing for firm i in year t. IT risk disclosure
(i.e., ITRFDit) is the count of risk factors associated
with the IT topic (i.e., topic 24), found in the 10-K
filing for firm i in year t. Each risk topic disclosure
(i.e., 𝑅𝐹𝑇𝑂𝑃𝐼𝐶()* where n Î [1,40]) is the count of risk
factors associated with topic n. When the model of
interest aims to disentangle the impacts of different
classes of IT risk, we used IT risk topic assignment. In
particular, IT value risk disclosure (i.e.,
ITPERFORMit) and IT cybersecurity risk disclosure
(i.e., ITSECURITYit) are obtained as the counts of IT

value risk factors and IT cybersecurity risk factors
disclosed in the 10-K filing for firm i in year t.
Our dependent variable is CRASHit+1 and it
refers to the stock price crash risk for the one-year
window following firm i filing a 10-K in year t.
Following prior studies on crash risk [8], [14]–[17], we
use the negative skewness of abnormal daily stock
return (i.e., NCSKEW) as our stock price crash risk
measure. Theoretically, the use of negative skewness
as a measure for stock price crash risk stems from the
dual observation that large movements in the market
tend to be negative rather than positive, giving stock
returns a negative skew and that volatility tends to go
up with negative returns. Additionally, high volatility
leads to a high-risk premium, which impairs the
impact of good news while enhancing the impact of
bad news. Crash risk is linked to negative skewness
based on the notion that volatility is a proxy for the
intensity of investors’ disagreement about a firm and
that during periods of high disagreement, bearish
investors are likely to be at an information advantage
[14]. We obtain control variables from Compustat and
also include the number of total risk factors disclosed,
NUMRFit, as a control variable as well as year and
industry dummies.

6 Model
Our first hypothesis is intended to answer if
IT risk factor disclosures in general have any
correlation with a firm’s stock price crash risk. We run
the following OLS regression model to test H1.
𝐶𝑅𝐴𝑆𝐻()./ = 𝛽2 + 𝛽/ 𝐼𝑇𝑅𝐹𝐷() + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜖() (1)
where ITRFDit is the count of IT-related risk factor
disclosures found in Item 1A for firm i in fiscal year t,
and CRASHit+1 refers to our crash risk measure.
Controls includes the following control
variables for determinants of crash risk identified in
previous studies: firm size for firm i at the fiscal yearend t, SIZEit; book-to-market ratio for firm i at the
fiscal year-end t, BMit; stock return momentum for
firm i in the fiscal year-end t, MOMit; abnormal trading
volume for firm i in the fiscal year-end t, ABVOLit;
stock return volatility of volume for firm i in the fiscal
year t, SIGMAit; leverage ratio of firm i at the fiscal
year-end t, LEVit; return over assets for firm i in the
fiscal year t, ROAit; earnings volatility for firm i in the
fiscal year t, ROA_STDit; operating cycle of firm i in
the fiscal year t, OCit; and sales growth of for firm i in
the fiscal year t, SGit. In all regressions, we also
include in our controls dummies for industry using the
Fama-French 12 industry classification and dummies
for fiscal years 2005 to 2016. When the aim is to
disentangle impacts of different classes of IT related
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risk disclosures and stock price crash risk, we used the
following OLS regression model:

risk factor topics into the model specified in (1). That
is:

𝐶𝑅𝐴𝑆𝐻()./ = 𝛽2 + 𝛽/ 𝐼𝑇𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀() +
𝛽? 𝐼𝑇𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑈𝑅𝐼𝑇𝑌() + 𝛽B 𝐼𝑇𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀() ∗
𝐼𝑇𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑈𝑅𝐼𝑇𝑌 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜖()

*
𝐶𝑅𝐴𝑆𝐻()./ = 𝛽2 + ∑E2
*F/ 𝛽* 𝑅𝐹𝑇𝑂𝑃𝐼𝐶() +
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜖()

(2)

where ITPERFORMit and ITSECURITYit refer to the
measures for IT value risk disclosure and
cybersecurity risk factor disclosure in Item 1A of a 10K annual report for firm i in fiscal year t, respectively.
We used the same Controls and CRASH in Equation
(1).

7 Results
7.1 Effects of IT Risk Factor Disclosure
Table 1. Effects of IT Risk Disclosure on
Stock Price Crashes
Intercept
ITRFD
SIZE
BM
MOM
SIGMA
ABVOL
ROA
ROA_STD
LEV
SG
OC
Industry Dummies
Year Dummies
Obs.
R2

Coefficient
0.630
0.069
0.007
0.060
-0.409
-7.875
0.003
-0.147
0.000
-0.017
0.000
0.000

[t-stat]
[4.75]***
[6.52]***
[0.91]
[3.72]***
[-6.55]***
[-5.70]***
[2.39]**
[-2.10]**
[6.32]***
[-0.26]
[-0.74]
[-0.03]
Yes
Yes
30347
0.0445

H1 is concerned with whether IT risk factor
disclosures in general have any effect on a firm’s stock
price crash risk. To test this, we regressed the number
of IT-related risk factors disclosed against the crash
risk measures following Equation (1). We run the
regression on the crash risk measure (i.e.,
NCSKEWit+1). The regression results are found in
Error! Reference source not found. and show that
IT-related risk factor disclosures are significantly
positively related to stock price crash risk for the oneyear window following the release of a 10-K annual
report. The coefficient (t-statistic) for ITRFDit is 0.069
(6.52).
One concern might be that the result that IT
related risk factor disclosure is associated the higher
stock price crash risk can be affected by the other risk
factor disclosures. As a robustness check, we ran the
same regression but included the counts of the other 39

(3)

where 𝑅𝐹𝑇𝑂𝑃𝐼𝐶()* refers to the count of risk factors of
topic n for firm i in year t. 𝑅𝐹𝑇𝑂𝑃𝐼𝐶()?E is equivalent
to ITRFDit. The regression results are found in Table 2
and show that the significant coefficient in Model (1)
reported in Table 1 remained significant even after
controlling for all other risk factor topics.
Table 2. Effects of All Risk Disclosure types
on Stock Price Crashes
Intercept
RFTOPIC1
⋮
RFTOPIC24 (ITRFD)
⋮
RFTOPIC40
SIZE
BM
MOM
SIGMA
ABVOL
ROA
ROA_STD
LEV
SG
OC
Industry Dummies
Year Dummies
Obs.
R2

Coefficient
[t-stat]
0.666 [4.85]***
0.042 [3.85]***
⋮ ⋮
0.058 [4.66]***
⋮ ⋮
-0.008 [-0.88]
0.004 [0.56]
0.067 [4.04]***
-0.407 [-6.49]***
-8.223 [-5.80]***
0.002 [1.89]*
-0.144 [-1.97]**
0.000 [6.75]***
-0.034 [-0.46]
0.000 [-0.42]
-0.004 [-0.25]
Yes
Yes
30347
0.0627

7.2 Cybersecurity and IT Value Risk
Disclosures
To examine the relation between IT risk
disclosures on stock price crash risk more closely, we
look at IT value risk disclosures and IT cybersecurity
risk disclosures separately and measure their effect on
a firm’s stock price crash risk. We followed Equation
(2) in regressing the number of IT cybersecurity and
IT value risks disclosed against the stock price crash
risk and the results are reported in Table 3. The
coefficient (t-statistic) for ITSECURITYit is 0.051
(2.20), indicating that IT cybersecurity related
disclosures are significantly and positively correlated
with a firm’s stock price crash risk in the one year
following such a disclosure. However, the coefficient
for ITPERFORMit is not significant. This is not in line
with our theoretical expectation.
We believe that differential effects can be
explained by how much risks are within the control of
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the companies. Since IT value creation is within the
purview of the leadership and management teams of
the companies, the market can interpret the IT value
risk as a risk of doing business. This is also consistent
with organizational errors notion of [18] that avoiding
an organizational error is “a hygiene or parity factor”
not a source of competitive advantage. Since cyber
security is often characterized as an arm race between
security practitioners and malicious actors [19], even
if the organization investments in security
technologies to bring the cyber risk to an acceptable
level, the ability of the firm to deal with the constantlyevolving vulnerabilities and attack vectors deteriorates
very quickly. Therefore, cybersecurity risk disclosure
can be viewed as an admission of deteriorating
conditions of the cybersecurity risks that the firm is
exposed to beyond the acceptable level.
Table 3. Effects of IT Value Risk Disclosure
and IT Security Risk Disclosure on Stock
Price Crashes
Intercept
ITPERFORM
ITSECURITY
ITPERFORM*ITSECURITY
SIZE
BM
MOM
SIGMA
ABVOL
ROA
ROA_STD
LEV
SG
OC
NUMRF
Industry Dummies
Year Dummies
Obs.
R2

Coefficient [t-stat]
0.627 [4.76]***
0.032 [0.86]
0.051 [2.20]**
-0.028 [-0.82]
0.008 [1.08]
0.053 [3.29]***
-0.411 [-6.56]***
-8.049 [-5.81]***
0.003 [2.51]***
-0.130 [-1.85]*
0.000 [5.79]***
-0.081 [-1.23]
0.000 [-0.89]
-0.009 [-0.62]
0.004 [4.90]***
Yes
Yes
30347
0.0434

cybersecurity risk – and shows that the latter type of
risk disclosure is associated with stock price crashes.
We also make methodological contributions by
providing a framework for conducting textual analysis
on risk factors contained in 10K annual reports and by
providing Java and Python source code to aid future
researchers in extracting risk factors.
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